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Abstract
Corporate sports sponsorship is an important part of many compa-
nies’ corporate communication strategy. We take the example of major
football tournaments to show that sponsorship indeed aﬀects the spon-
sor’s (stock) market value. We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact of
football results (at an individual game level) of the seven most impor-
tant football nations at European and World Championships on the
stock prices of jersey sponsors. In general, the more important a match
and the less expected its result, the higher its impact. In addition, we
ﬁnd a form of “mere exposure”-eﬀect which contradicts the eﬃcient
markets hypothesis.
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11 Introduction
Corporate sports sponsorship is an integral part of many companies’ cor-
porate communication strategy. Some of them spend enormous sums for
sponsoring teams and/or individuals: According to “The Economist”, Adi-
das supports the German national football team with USD 298 million1
although its rival Nike even placed oﬀers of up to USD 778 million for an
eight year contract.2 After a failed bid for the German national team, Nike
signed a 7.5-year contract with the French national football team (MSNBC,
2008). The US-based company will invest USD 506 million to be the French
team’s jersey supplier for 2011–2018.3
Reasons for pursuing sponsorship-linked marketing programs are dis-
cussed, e.g., in Cornwell et al. (2001, pp. 18f.). Apart from some distinctive
features, such as hospitality at sports events, sponsorships share many goals
of traditional advertising campaigns, ﬁrst and foremost an increasing media
exposure leading to an increase in corporate sales. This is particularly true
for sports events watched by a large number of viewers in many countries,
which makes major football tournaments an ideal ﬁeld to assess the impact
of sports sponsorships on the sponsoring companies’ stock prices.
While many previous studies tried to measure the impact of sponsorships
on constructs like brand awareness or corporate image (see, e.g. Quester,
1997), Cornwell et al. (2001) were the ﬁrst to attempt measuring the value
of winning at sports events for the sponsor via the impact of sports results on
the sponsors’ stock price. They examine results in the Indianapolis 500 mile
race and ﬁnd abnormal returns for the sponsors of winners which, however,
1http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.dfm?story\_id=
11825607
2http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/109198 This oﬀer amounts to ap-
proximately 30% of Nike’s 2008 EBITDA (Source: Capital IQ).
3http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23295580/
2depend on a number of race- and sponsorship-related variables. Among
those, variables related to the ex ante probability of winning played a major
role. A second important ﬁnding relates to the degree of matching between
sponsor and event: Companies whose products are somewhat related to the
automotive industry faced larger stock price increases after wins of “their”
drivers than those with relatively low racing congruence. Third, they ﬁnd
a form of “mere exposure”-eﬀect: The number of laps leading is positively
related to the sponsor’s stock return. The explanation is simple: The more
laps a car leads, the more TV time for the sponsor.
Related work includes, e.g., Edmans et al. (2007) who study the impact
of football results on major stock indices of teams’ home countries. They
argue that sudden changes in investor sentiment caused by football results
show up in the country’s stock market’s performance on the next trading
day, e.g., an abnormal decline in the DAX following a defeat of the German
national football team. In particular, they ﬁnd (i) an asymmetric eﬀect on
the stock market index after wins/defeats of the national team (there is no
abnormal positive return after victories), (ii) stronger eﬀects for knockout
games, and (iii) the strongest eﬀects for unanticipated losses. They attribute
asymmetry to an allegiance bias, stating that those who are psychologically
invested in a desired outcome generate biased predictions. To the extent
that fans overestimate the true pre-game probability of their team winning,
stock price impacts of winning will be dampened, while those of losing the
match will be ampliﬁed. As the defeat of a country’s football team can be
deemed irrelevant for its economy as a whole, these results are in contrast
to the semi-strong form of the eﬃcient market hypothesis (see Fama (1970))
and can only be attributed to investor sentiment.
Another related strand of research is the rather neoclassically oriented
3part of the sponsorship event study literature. Examples include sponsor-
ship announcements, as in Cornwell et al. (2005); Clark et al. (2009) and
corporate event sponsorships, as in Mishra et al. (1997).4 Clark et al. (2009)
analyze the impact of title event sponsorship announcements on shareholder
wealth of the sponsors. Their sample includes title sponsorships in tennis,
golf, NASCAR-racing, and college bowl games. In the overall sample they
ﬁnd that sponsorship deals are signed at market clearing prices, as there
is no reaction in the stock prices of the company. After splitting the sam-
ple they ﬁnd a positive relationship between sports discipline and sponsor’s
closeness to this discipline. Mishra et al. (1997) study the impact of spon-
sorship announcements of major events, like the Olympics, international
football tournaments, tennis tournaments, the naming of stadiums used by
major league professional teams, etc. on the sponsors’ stock prices. They
ﬁnd a positive stock price reaction after the announcement for the sponsor-
ing companies, indicating that the market views the sponsorship deals as
positive investments (from a shareholder value perspective).
We follow the ideas of Cornwell et al. (2001) and Edmans et al. (2007)
and study whether changes in jersey sponsors’ stock prices can be detected
after matches of sponsored teams. In addition, we test for a “mere exposure”-
eﬀect related to that described in Cornwell et al. (2001). For reasons of me-
dia coverage and spectator numbers, we focus on those football events with
the largest TV audience: the World Cup and the European Championships.
According to a FIFA report on the World Cup 2006 in Germany, the cumu-
lative TV audience for all games was estimated at around 26 billion, and
the ﬁnal alone was watched by 715 million viewers.5 More (less) TV time




4should lead to higher (lower) expected turnover and proﬁts due to increased
(decreased) sales for the sponsors. Consequently, wins (defeats) should yield
positive (negative) stock price reactions. The size of this eﬀect is to be ex-
pected to depend on the relevance of matches (group vs. knockout matches)
and should be most pronounced for the most popular teams. According to
standard ﬁnance theory (eﬃcient markets hypothesis), such eﬀects should
only be expected to the extent the result is not anticipated by the market:
The less expected the result, the higher its impact should be.
In particular, we study eﬀects of football matches of national teams on
returns of jersey sponsors’ stock prices. Due to a diﬀerent setting (many
events over extended periods of time), our methodology diﬀers from the
rather classical event study methodology followed by many of the papers
cited above. Using data from seven tournaments between 1996 and 2008,
we document a form of “mere exposure”-eﬀect contradicting the eﬃcient
markets hypothesis: There are signiﬁcantly positive returns after matches
where both teams sponsored by the same company play each other. Second,
we ﬁnd a statistically and economically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of defeats.
Diﬀerentiating according to the importance of matches, we ﬁnd a higher
impact of matches in the knockout phase compared to those in the group
phase as third major ﬁnding. This makes good economic sense since winning
or losing in the knockout phase has more direct consequences for a team
and hence for a sponsor compared to the group phase. Fourth, the eﬀects
of defeats in total and in knockout matches become more signiﬁcant when
we account for the ex ante probability of winning/losing the match.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our data. In Section
3, we describe our research questions and method. Section 4 presents the
results, which are then discussed in Section 5.
52 Data
2.1 Data on Football Matches
We collect football results from the most important tournaments, the World
Cup and the European Championships, for the time period 1996 to 2008.6
All relevant variables for each match such as the result, the local kick-oﬀ
and ending times (including overtime of 30 minutes and penalty shoot-
out where applicable) were taken from http://www.rdasilva.demon.co.uk
and http://www.kicker.de.
Taking the 2006 World Cup in Germany as an example, 32 nations that
qualiﬁed in the preceding two years in regional qualiﬁcation groups (“quali-
ﬁcation matches”) play in a four weeks tournament for the World Cup. The
World Cup tournament itself starts with round-robin groups of four nations
each. The best two teams from each group advance to the round of sixteen.
At this stage, the mode of play changes to knockout: The winner advances
to the next round, whereas the losing nation is out of the tournament. This
is relevant for the importance of the results: Whereas in “group matches”
losing a match may be irrelevant (e.g., when the team has already collected
enough points to ensure a top-two place within the group), in “knockout
matches” the consequences are more serious: the losing team is eliminated
from the tournament.
In general, the mode of qualifying for the European Championships is
very similar to that of the World Cup. Until 1992 the European Champi-
onships were played with eight teams in two groups. Since 1996, the number
of participating nations is 16, with knockout matches beginning in the quar-
ter ﬁnals.
With reference to our data set, we do not include the “qualiﬁcation
6Both events take place every four years.
6matches” for both the World Cup and the European Championships. In-
stead, we only focus on ”group matches” and ”knockout matches” of the
tournaments. Similar to Edmans et al. (2007), we focus only on matches of
the “Big 7” football nations ARG, BRA, ENG, ESP, FRA, GER, and ITA.
We exclude ENG from our sample due to a relatively short observation pe-
riod for England’s jersey supplier UMBRO and due to quite illiquid trading
after UMBRO’s IPO. UMBRO went public in May 2004 (i.e., there are no
stock price data before this date) and was taken over by Nike at the end of
2007.
In total, our data set consists of 161 matches, with 87 World Cup matches
and 74 matches at the European Championships. We count 124 matches of
national teams that played with Adidas jerseys, 19 matches of national teams
sponsored by Nike and 18 matches of national teams wearing Puma jerseys.
Compared to previous event studies on sport sponsorship our data sample
is large; to our knowledge, the sponsorship study of Clark et al. (2009) is
the largest one with 114 observations.
2.2 Stock Market Data
We obtain daily stock market data adjusted for stock splits and dividends
from Thomson Datastream from January 2, 1996 until December 31, 2008.7
We focus solely on Adidas, Nike and Puma as they are the only quoted
jersey sponsors of national football teams (apart from UMBRO as discussed
at the end of the previous section). As a benchmark index for each stock,
we use the (total return variant of the) relevant market index, which is the
DAX30 for Adidas, the S&P 500 for Nike and the CDAX for Puma. The
indices are also obtained from Thomson Datastream.
7We restrict our sample to this time span as Adidas went public in November 1995.
72.3 Matching Stock Prices and Competition Days
To measure the impact of international football results on the stock price of
the relevant jersey sponsor, we mainly use the companies’ continuously com-
pounded return on the ﬁrst trading day following the match day. In most of
the observations the match ended after the close of trading at the relevant
stock markets (i.e., Deutsche B¨ orse for Adidas and Puma, and NYSE for
Nike). For these matches, the ﬁrst chance for new information on victo-
ries/defeats of sponsored national teams to be reﬂected in the companies’
stock prices is the day following the match day. In some other cases, matches
end a few hours before the ﬁnal bell of relevant stock markets due to time
zone diﬀerences.8 For instance, all matches in the 2002 World Cup in Japan
and South Korea ended before 11:30 p.m. local time. Due to the diﬀerence
of 13 hours between Japanese Standard Time and Eastern Standard Time
the relevant information arrives in New York before noon and thus should
be reﬂected in Nike’s stock price already on the match day. As a conven-
tion, we use the sponsor’s stock return of the match day if the match ended
before 1 p.m. stock market time. In all other cases the company’s return of
the following trading day was used. Thus, the company’s return of the next
trading day was used in 94% of all observations, while the match day was
relevant in the remaining 6%. This is in contrast to Edmans et al. (2007)
who use the next trading day throughout. However, we believe that our
convention better accounts for the eﬀects of matches ending a considerable
amount of time before the relevant markets close.
8This is only relevant for some matches on weekdays during World Cup tournaments.
83 Research Questions and Method
Our research questions are mainly inspired by the studies cited in the intro-
duction. In addition, we investigate a possible “mere exposure”-eﬀect of the
company’s name appearing on TV separately from any (additional) impact
of winning or losing: Exposure to the company’s name may not only entice
consumers to buy a company’s products, but also trigger additional interest
in the company by investors, leading to increased demand for the company’s
stocks reﬂected in positive abnormal returns. This eﬀect may even be more
pronounced when both teams competing are sponsored by the same com-
pany. Thus, eﬀects of winning/losing and mere exposure on the sponsor’s
stock price are the two main topics around which our research questions are
centered. The ﬁrst research question is inspired by Cornwell et al. (2001):
1. Does winning and/or losing at major football tournaments aﬀect the
jersey sponsor’s stock price? If the answer is positive:
(a) Do the results depend on game importance (group vs. knockout
games)? As reported above, Edmans et al. (2007) ﬁnd a more
pronounced eﬀect of losing in knockout matches at international
tournaments.
(b) Do the results change if only accounting for the “surprising part”
of victories/defeats? Again, we relate this research question to
Cornwell et al. (2001) and to Edmans et al. (2007). The former
ﬁnd a stronger eﬀect of pre-race outsiders victories in contrast to
pre-race favorites and the latter report the strongest eﬀects for
unanticipated losses.
(c) Is there an asymmetric reaction between wins and defeats (at-
tributed to an allegiance bias by Edmans et al. (2007)) also at
9the individual stock level?
2. Does the jersey sponsor’s stock price react positively to the mere ex-
posure in matches at major football tournaments? Is this eﬀect more
pronounced if both teams competing share the same jersey sponsor?
This exposure eﬀect is inspired by the positive inﬂuence of the number
of laps leading found in Cornwell et al. (2001).
To answer these research questions, we isolate in a ﬁrst step the “abnor-
mal” returns of the stocks in our sample by using the index model (standard
OLS). In a second step we regress the residuals of step one against football-
related independent variables in a panel regression model. The basic idea
of this model is that stock prices generally reﬂect the fundamental value
(NPV) of the company, and (signiﬁcant) changes in the stock price are due
to new information about the company. Contrary to many of the studies
cited in the introduction, the structure of our data does not lend itself to
the standard event study methodology: We do not have rather long “unaf-
fected” time windows before and after our events (matches). Instead, during
tournaments, there are usually several periods where at least one match is
played every day.
3.1 Step 1: OLS Estimation
In a ﬁrst step we calculate log returns from the respective stock prices after
adjusting for stock splits and dividend payments. These log returns will be
used as the dependent variable:
Ri;t = ln(Pi;t) − ln(Pi;t 1), (1)
10where i ∈ {ADS, NKE, PUM} denotes the ticker symbol and t = 2,...,T
the trading day. Returns of the relevant stock indices, which are used as
explanatory variables, are computed analogously.
Equation (2) deﬁnes the OLS equation of step one with Rm
i;t standing
for the relevant market index return. To account for possible day-of-the-
week eﬀects, we also include weekday dummies
∑5
d=2 δdWEEKDAYd for
each day except Monday. Possible autocorrelation is captured by ﬁrst-order
AR terms. Football-related dummy variables will be included later in the
panel regression (step 2).
Ri;t = αi + β1Rm
i;t +
∑5
d=2 δi;dWEEKDAYd;t + βAR;iAR(1)i + εi;t ∀i.(2)
3.2 Step 2: Base-case Panel Regression
The residuals εi;t of stock i of equation (2) serve as the dependent variable in
the base-case panel regression model with i cross-sections and t observations
over time:
εi;t = α + β1SPONSORi;t + β2DOUBLE SPONSORi;t + β3WINi;t
+β4DEFEATi;t + ϵi;t. (3)
Here, the dummy variable SPONSORi;t is set to 1 if at least one match
with a team sponsored by company i was played at day t. The dummy
DOUBLE SPONSORi;t equals 1 if at least one match with both teams spon-
sored by company i was played at day t. WINi;t equals 1 if the number of
victories less the number of defeats of teams supplied by sponsor i at day t
is positive, zero otherwise and DEFEATi;t equals 1 if the sum of wins less
defeats of teams supplied by sponsor i at day t is negative, zero otherwise.
Hence, equation (3) provides tests of research questions 1, 1(c) and 2. In
11each panel regression in this paper we apply the White period coeﬃcient
covariance method (White, 1980) to account for heteroscedasticity and non-
gaussianity in the residuals.
3.3 Step 2: Panel Regression: Importance of Games { Knock-
out Stage
Matches diﬀer in importance. At the World Cup and the European Cham-
pionships, teams start with round-robin matches in groups of four. Losing
such a match need not mean the end of the tournament – the team may still
advance to the knockout phase. In contrast, any knockout match lost means
that the team is irrevocably out of the competition, with the consequences of
massively reduced media coverage and declining merchandise sales. There-
fore, it is reasonable to expect our eﬀects to depend on the importance of
the respective match.
εi;t = α + β1DOUBLE SPONSORi;t · KOt + β2WINi;t · KOt +
+β3DEFEATi;t · KOt + ϵi;t (4)
Here and in all subsequent regressions, the SPONSOR-dummy, which turns
out to be insigniﬁcant already in the base case (see Section 4.1), is dropped.
Since group matches and knockout matches are never played on the same
day (for any of the sponsors), KOt only carries one subscript (t).
Equation (4) applies the base-case equation (3) only to knockout matches
by interacting all dummy variables with the variable KOt which is a binary
dummy for all knockout matches. This enables us to answer research ques-
tions 1(a), 1(c) and 2 (tests on the latter two serve as robustness checks,
since they can already be answered with equation (3)).
123.4 Step 2: Panel Regression: Pre-Game Win/Defeat Prob-
ability
From a neoclassical ﬁnance theory perspective, stock market reactions should
be the larger the less anticipated certain news/events are. Hence, we incor-
porate a proxy for the pre-game win/defeat probability for each observation
identical to Edmans et al. (2007) who use ELO ratings to measure the close-
ness in the pre-game ability of the opponents.9 ELO ratings, developed by
Arpad Elo, were originally used to rank chess players. The system has been
modiﬁed to rank football teams by accounting for the type of game (from
World Cup to friendly match), the goal diﬀerence, and the pre-game win
probabilities of both teams. Hence, the current ELO rating is an indicator
of the past performance of a team. The idea is similar to the FIFA-ranking10
and there is evidence that this approach proxies (objective) pre-game prob-
abilities quite accurately.11
Let ELOA (ELOB) be the pre-game ELO rating for a win of team A











with (1-P(WIN)TEAMA) the pre-game probability for a win of team B.12
9We use their modiﬁed proxy ignoring a home advantage, since there is no such eﬀect
in games at the World Cup and the European Championship. Even though a nation in
our sample may be the organizer of a World Cup or a European Championship, the home
advantage is much smaller compared to World cup qualiﬁers, since many tickets have to
be sold to international spectators.
10http://www.fifa.com/worldfootball/ranking/lastranking/gender=m/
fullranking.html
11Andersson et al. (2005, 2009) provide evidence for the high quality of football rankings,
as a betting strategy following the FIFA-ranking has outperformed the predictions of
experts (e.g., sports journalists, trainers) for the World Cups in 2002 and 2006.
12See www.eloratings.net for further information. E.g., assume the following pre-game
ELO ratings of the following games: AUT (1562) vs. GER (1938) and ITA (2003) vs. GER
(1938). Hence, P(WIN)AUT=9.4% and P(WIN)GER=90.6%, whereas P(WIN)ITA=56.7%
and P(WIN)GER=43.3%.
13As there is sometimes more than one match played by teams with a
speciﬁc jersey supplier i on day t, we calculate P(WIN) as the average of all
individual P(WIN) probabilities of all teams of sponsor i playing on day t.
Including the pre-game probability of win/defeat for each team, we mod-
ify equations (3) and (4) and arrive at an elaborated version of the base case,
εi;t = α + β1DOUBLE SPONSORi;t + β2WINi;t · (1 − P(WIN)i;t) +
+β3DEFEATi;t · P(WIN)i;t + ϵi;t, (6)
and at the following equation, measuring unanticipated eﬀects of wins/defeats
in knockout matches:
εi;t = α + β1DOUBLE SPONSORi;t · KOt
+β2WINi;t · KOt · (1 − P(WIN)i;t) (7)
+β3DEFEATi;t · KOt · P(WIN)i;t + ϵi;t.
It is evident in both equations that the larger P(WIN), the lower (higher)
will be its impact on the independent variable WINi;t ... (DEFEATi;t ...)
and hence the more (less) expected and the less (more) relevant is this
observation. With the speciﬁcations in equations (6) and (7) answers to the
research questions 1(b), 1(a), 1(c), and 2 can be provided (tests on the latter
three serve as robustness checks, since they can already be answered with
equations (3) and (4)). Note that the values of β2 and β3 from equations
(6) and (7) cannot be directly compared to β2 and β3 from equation (3) and
(4): Since both P(WIN) < 1 and (1 − P(WIN)) < 1, the coeﬃcients must
increase in magnitude after accounting for P(WIN). However, an increase
in statistical signiﬁcance of β2 and/or β3 would be in line with standard
ﬁnance theory.
14Keep in mind, however, that we include a proxy for the objective pre-
game win/defeat probabilities. As pointed out by Edmans et al. (2007, p.
5), an allegiance bias might be at work here: A number of studies have
shown that people who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome
generate biased predictions. To the extent that fans overestimate the true
pre-game probability of their team winning, stock price impacts of winning
will be dampened, while those of losing the match will be ampliﬁed. This
would show up in our results as an asymmetry in the following sense: Even
after adjusting for the objective pre-game win/defeat probabilities, eﬀects
of winning a match may still be smaller than those of defeats.
4 Results
First we run an OLS-regression (equation (2)) for each stock i to arrive at
the residual series for our panel-regression model (to be used later in step
2). The results are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 about here
All alphas are insigniﬁcant, and there are no day-of-the-week eﬀects. Magni-
tude and sign of AR coeﬃcients are in line with previous empirical ﬁndings
for equity returns (see, e.g., Taylor (2005)).
4.1 Panel Regression: Base Case
The regression results from equation (3) are shown in Table 2. They provide
us with the following answers to our research questions:
1. Defeats show a signiﬁcantly negative impact on the jersey suppliers’
stock returns.
15(a) Will be answered in Section 4.2.
(b) Will be answered in Section 4.2.
(c) While defeats have a negative impact on the sponsor’s stock price,
there is no corresponding positive eﬀect of victories.
2. While there is no “mere exposure”-eﬀect in the sense of positive abnor-
mal returns for the sponsoring company’s stocks after matches where
one of the teams wears the sponsor’s jerseys, there is a signiﬁcantly
positive impact after matches where both teams have the same jersey
supplier. Although somewhat similar to the positive inﬂuence of the
“number of laps leading” in Cornwell et al. (2001), this presents a
puzzle for those who believe in informationally eﬃcient markets: Un-
like the former eﬀect, where the number of laps leading is unknown in
advance, the information that two teams sponsored by the same com-
pany will play each other is known well in advance of the time when
the excess returns are actually observed. The eﬃcient markets hy-
pothesis (in its semi-strong form, see Fama (1970)) would predict that
if this represents a positive value to the company, this value should
already be reﬂected at the time the information becomes public. So
even if sponsorship justiﬁes a positive reaction of the sponsoring com-
pany’s stock price, this should not be observed after the game, but
well before.
The eﬀects described are not only statistically signiﬁcant, but also eco-
nomically relevant (daily excess returns on the order of 0.3 to 0.7 percentage
points). It is interesting to see the asymmetric eﬀects of wins/losses, ﬁrst de-
scribed by Edmans et al. (2007) in the form of negative excess index returns
at the losing country’s major stock exchange, also for the jersey suppliers.
The explanations we can oﬀer for this eﬀect are essentially the same as those
16provided by Edmans et al. (2007) and can be attributed to the allegiance
bias. Another possible explanation is that the teams in our sample (six of the
seven top football nations!) are expected to win most matches, so victories
would be mostly expected, while defeats would be, on average, unexpected.
We control for this eﬀect in the following section.
Table 2 about here
4.2 Panel Regression: Game Importance and Pre-Game Win/Defeat
Probability
Table 3 shows the results from equations (4), (6) and (7), accounting for both
game importance (group vs. knockout games) and the (objective) pre-game
probability of winning.
The ﬁrst results column restricts the application of the base case regres-
sion equation to knockout games only (cf. equation (4)). Comparing this
column to Table 2, we ﬁnd that both the “mere exposure”-eﬀect for both
teams sponsored by the same company and the eﬀect of a defeat increase,
conﬁrming the higher importance of knockout games relative to those at the
group stage. This answers our Research Question 1.(a) and implies that
game importance matters.
The second column controls for the (objective) pre-game probability of
winning/losing. The defeat coeﬃcient increases in magnitude since the prob-
ability of winning is strictly smaller than 1 by construction (cf. the discus-
sion in Section 3.4). Both the coeﬃcients for victories and defeats increase
markedly in signiﬁcance when including only the “unexpected part” of the
results, thus supporting a positive answer to Research Question 1.(b) im-
plying that unexpected results have the strongest impact.
The third column shows the increased signiﬁcance of unanticipated losses
17in knockout games in contrast to the sample of knockout games (column 1)
and the impact of knockout games in contrast to the entire data sample
when we control for the ex ante probabilities of winning/losing (column 2).
As a robustness check for DOUBLE SPONSOR, we also added this vari-
able in all three equations of Table 3 and ﬁnd that the “mere exposure”-eﬀect
is very robust and yields even higher returns in all speciﬁcations than in the
base case of Table 2.
At the end of the previous section, we oﬀered as an alternative expla-
nation for the insigniﬁcant impact of victories the high average pre-game
probability of winning for the teams in our sample. If this were the only
reason for the observed asymmetry between winning and losing, we would
expect the victory coeﬃcient to become signiﬁcant after accounting for the
ex ante result probability. However, despite the increased statistical signif-
icance of this coeﬃcient (albeit still only at the 17% level), its economic
signiﬁcance remains negligible (note that the 0.18 are still to be multiplied
with (1 − P(WIN)) ≪ 1).
Table 3 about here
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We investigated the impact of football results on jersey sponsors’ stock prices
and found abnormal returns following matches of the “Big 7” football nations
at major football tournaments. Four main ﬁndings can be reported: First,
matches where both teams share the same jersey supplier lead to positive
excess returns. Second, defeats lead to negative excess returns. Third, both
eﬀects are larger for knockout games than for group games, reﬂecting the
higher importance of the knockout stage in the tournaments. Fourth, the
18defeat-eﬀect in total and in knockout games is more signiﬁcant when we
account for the pre-game defeat-probability.
While the latter two points are perfectly in line with standard ﬁnancial
theory, the observed positive excess returns after games where both teams
share the same jersey sponsor are diﬃcult to reconcile with the semi-strong
form of the Eﬃcient Markets Hypothesis: According to the theory, these
positive excess returns should occur at the time the information about this
situation occurring is made public as opposed to only after the game has
been played. From a marketing point of view, these positive returns can be
best explained as a form of “mere exposure”-eﬀect. The asymmetry between
eﬀects of wins and defeats can be explained by an allegiance bias. From a
ﬁnance point of view, proﬁtable trading strategies based on these results
could have been followed during our observation period: Positive excess
returns (before transaction costs) could be generated by going long on the
day when two teams with the same jersey supplier played each other and
selling the stocks at the end of the next trading day.
In principal, the documented stock price eﬀects of sponsorship activities
could be used to assist in pricing sponsorship agreements: The observed
changes in market value can be interpreted as the stock market’s assessment
of the value of sponsorship activities (at the individual game level) to the
company.
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Table 1: OLS-regression (step 1, equation (2)) for each stock i.












































R2 21.53 19.60 12.02
n 3306 3391 3239
Dependent variable: daily log returns. Coeﬃcient values are given in percentage points
and p-values of a double-sided test are provided in parentheses. ** and *** represent the
5% and 1% signiﬁcance levels.
22Table 2: Panel regression (step 2, equation (3)) measuring the impact of the
“mere exposure”-eﬀect and winning/losing on the stock market performance
of the jersey suppliers.





















Dependent variable: "i;t, i.e. the residuals (for stock i) of equation 2. Coeﬃcient values
are given in percentage points and t-values are provided in parentheses. *** represents
the 1% signiﬁcance level for a double-sided test.
23Table 3: Panel regression (step 2, equations (4), (6) and (7)) measuring the
impact of the “mere exposure”-eﬀect and winning/losing on the stock market
performance of the jersey suppliers. Additional variables: (P(WIN)) – proxy
for the (objective) pre-game probability of winning and KOt – dummy for
knockout games.
Factor Knockout Base-case Knockout matches







DOUBLE SPONSOR – 0.628
(4.111)
–




WIN · KOt 0.094
(0.288)
– –
DEFEAT · KOt −0.483
(-4.444)
– –
WIN · (1 − P(WIN)) – 0.184
(1.391)
–
DEFEAT · P(WIN) – −0.682
(-5.612)
–
WIN · KOt · (1 − P(WIN)) – – 0.664
(0.913)
DEFEAT · KOt · P(WIN) – – −1.103
(-6.355)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
n 9939 9939 9939
Dependent variable: "i;t, i.e. the residuals (for stock i) of equation 2. Coeﬃcient values
are given in percentage points and t-values are provided in parentheses. *** represents
the 1% signiﬁcance level for a double-sided test.
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Corporate sports sponsorship is an important part of many companies’ corporate 
communication strategy. We take the example of major football tournaments to show 
that sponsorship indeed affects the sponsor’s (stock) market value. We find a 
statistically significant impact of football results (at an individual game level) of the 
seven most important football nations at European and World Championships on the 
stock prices of jersey sponsors. In general, the more important a match and the less 
expected its result, the higher its impact. In addition, we find a form of “mere 
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